
The electricity network is a prerequisite for electrification. It must connect new solar power, battery storage, charging, industry and new homes, while maintaining security of supply. This will require substantial investment. The relevant question is therefore not whether the electricity network may cost money, but which costs customers should reasonably bear and what return is justified for network owners.
Electricity network operations are a natural monopoly. Customers cannot choose their network company and, in practice, cannot do without the service. Regulation must therefore protect customers without undermining the incentive to invest. The Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate (Ei) sets revenue caps intended to cover efficient costs, depreciation and a reasonable return on capital [1,2].
It is reasonable for customers to ask why network charges are rising when, in many cases, the electricity network appears unchanged. Ei’s review of the sector shows both rising charges and a financially strong network sector. For households, electricity network charges rose on average by significantly more than the consumer price index over the period 2005–2026, while network companies’ profitability and capital strength remained high [1].
This does not mean that every high margin is unreasonable. Electricity networks are capital-intensive assets with long lifespans, and network companies need financial capacity for maintenance, capacity increases and preparedness. But when charge increases, high margins and substantial dividends or group contributions coincide, the regulatory framework must be able to show that customers’ money is being used efficiently [1].
A revenue cap is a ceiling, not a guarantee of a certain amount being charged. The fact that a network company may charge a certain amount of revenue does not mean that it should always do so.
A sustainable starting point is simple: customers should pay for an efficient, robust and future-proof electricity network, not for inefficiency, excessive compensation or capital that the network owner has not had to put at risk.
A well-balanced revenue cap should therefore consist of four parts:
The network owner must be able to provide reliable operation and good quality, but inefficiency should not automatically be passed on to customers.
Investments should be repaid over the economic life of the assets.
The return must be sufficient to attract long-term capital, while reflecting the actual risk of a regulated monopoly business.
Remuneration should reward shorter connection times, high quality of supply, released capacity and smarter use of the existing electricity network.
The important thing is that regulation rewards results, not just the volume of investment. An expensive electricity network is not automatically a better one.
A key issue is how the networks’ capital base is valued. The Swedish Competition Authority has warned that a valuation based on replacement costs could contribute to charges that are higher than justified by actual costs. If older assets are valued as though they were being built new today, rising construction costs could drive up the allowed revenue, even if the network owner’s actual capital requirements have not increased at the same rate [3].
At the same time, this discussion needs to avoid false dichotomies. Sweden needs more network capacity. But the need for investment does not make every valuation or return method reasonable. Regulation must be able to distinguish between investments that increase capacity or quality and revenue increases that are primarily a result of the calculation model.
Ei set revenue caps for the 2024–2027 period at around SEK 326 billion in 2022 prices. This underlines how significant the choice of methodology is for households, businesses and the cost of electrification [2].
A particularly important principle concerns connection charges. When the customer has paid for a connection, the regulatory framework should avoid allowing the same capital to generate ongoing returns in the network’s asset base. Otherwise, there is a risk of double compensation: the customer first pays for the connection and then pays returns on the same investment through the network charge.
The issue has been raised in the discussion about future electricity network regulation. At the same time, any changes must be designed so that network companies continue to have strong incentives to connect new customers quickly and efficiently [4]. The right approach is therefore to clearly distinguish compensation for the actual connection cost from returns on capital that the network owner has itself raised and put at risk.
In a more decentralised electricity system, simply building more of the electricity network is not enough. Solar power, batteries, flexible electricity use and local market solutions can in some cases free up capacity faster and more cheaply than traditional network expansion. This is not an argument against new power lines, substations and transformers. It is an argument for assessing every investment against alternative ways of creating the same benefits for customers and the system.
Network regulation should therefore ask questions such as:
The conversation on Energistrategipodden about electricity network regulation and the profitability of network companies shows that, ultimately, the issue is one of trust: trust that investments are made, trust that they are necessary and trust that customers do not pay more than necessary [4,5].
Ei is working on the next regulatory period, 2028–2031, and intends to change the fundamental principle for valuing the asset base. The most significant change is a shift from a capacity-preserving to a wealth-preserving principle [4,6].
Under the current model, existing network assets are valued mainly at replacement cost. The principle is capacity-preserving: the regulation is based on what it would cost to replace an existing cable, substation or transformer with an equivalent asset today. The value is adjusted upwards in line with the construction cost index. When construction and civil engineering costs rise sharply, the asset base and the allowed return can therefore increase, even for assets that have already been built [4].
The proposed model is instead based on acquisition costs and is wealth-preserving. It focuses more on preserving the value of the capital actually invested, rather than continually valuing the entire existing electricity network as though it were to be rebuilt at today’s cost. Ei considers that this principle better reflects the actual costs incurred by network companies [4].
| Question | Current principle: capacity preservation |
New principle from 2028: capital preservation |
|---|---|---|
| Valuation basis | Replacement cost: what it would cost to build an equivalent facility today | Acquisition cost: based on the capital invested |
| Index sensitivity | Highly sensitive to construction and infrastructure indices | Less directly sensitive to construction cost indices; the CPI becomes more relevant to cost trends |
| Economic rationale | Ensures the ability to replace the same physical capacity | Safeguards the value of the capital actually invested |
| Risk in the current debate | Revaluation of older facilities may increase the capital base and revenue cap | Tempers the future revaluation of the existing capital base |
For network owners, the change primarily means that the automatic increase in the value of the existing capital base will be limited. High construction cost indices will no longer feed through to the revenue cap for existing networks in the same way. As a result, future revenue growth will depend less on the cost of building an entirely new network today and be more closely linked to companies’ actual investments, costs and capital employed [4].
It is important to distinguish between a slower rate of growth and an immediate reduction. Ei has stated that the opening capital base in 2028 is to correspond to the closing capital base in 2027. The change is therefore not intended to mechanically write down the capital base overnight. For network owners, this means that the transition itself will not result in a sudden loss of revenue, but that revenue caps and network charges are expected in the long term to be lower than they would have been under the old method [4].
Network owners will therefore need to demonstrate to a greater extent that new investments deliver tangible benefits for customers and the system: new capacity, faster connections, higher quality of supply or increased resilience. For companies with large, older asset bases, the economic effect is likely to be mainly a slowdown in valuation-driven revenue growth. Companies making well-justified new investments will retain the opportunity to recover costs and earn a reasonable return on new, efficient capital.
In practice, the old principle answers the question: What would it cost to maintain the same physical network capacity if the network had to be rebuilt today? The new principle instead starts from the question: What capital has the network company actually invested, and what compensation is needed to preserve its economic value?
The difference is particularly significant when construction cost indices diverge sharply from general cost trends. Under a capacity-preserving model, increases in the cost of new construction can have a major impact on existing assets. Under a wealth-preserving model, the link between actual capital investment, depreciation and allowed returns is clearer.
Ei’s representatives also emphasise that the change is primarily a criticism of the method—not an assertion that network companies have acted unlawfully. The companies have applied the regulatory framework that was in force. The purpose of the reform is to create more accurate regulation going forward [4].
Electricity network owners must be able to earn a return. Without long-term, stable terms, the investments required for electrification will be difficult to make. But the return should be payment for genuine capital committed, genuine risk and real benefits to customers—not the result of a model that overvalues old assets or remunerates the same capital twice.
The electricity network may cost what is necessary to make it robust, efficient and ready for the future. But every pound must be justified. That is how we combine investment capacity with reasonable network charges and build confidence in the energy transition.
We know it isn’t always easy to know which product or solution is best for you. Whether you have questions about our range, need guidance or would like help finding a solution that suits your specific needs, we’re here for you. With our knowledge and experience, we’ll help you make the right choice.


